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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
James McBride appeals an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
denying his petition1
                                              
1 The petition under review is the amended petition 
filed on McBride’s behalf on January 15, 2008. 
 under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for habeas 
corpus relief from a state murder conviction.  McBride argues 
3 
 
that his petition should have been granted because his 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel was 
violated when his counsel failed to object to various 
references the prosecutor made at trial to what McBride 
alleges were matters implicating his constitutional right to 
remain silent.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.    
 
I. Background and Procedural History 
 
A. Background 
 
McBride and his wife, Kelly McBride (“Kelly”),2
                                              
2 For simplicity, and meaning no disrespect by over-
familiarity, we will refer to Kelly McBride by her first name. 
 
hosted a party at their apartment on February 17, 1984.  
According to McBride, Kelly left their home the next 
morning and he did not see her again.  She was reported 
missing in March 1984 by her parents and was never found.  
On May 25, 1984, Judith Seagraves, a neighbor of the 
McBrides, observed McBride’s father and McBride’s 
landlord removing a bloody mattress from the McBrides’ 
apartment, so she called the police.  When the police arrived, 
they searched the apartment and found a bureau which had 
been nailed shut.  When they opened the bureau, they found 
that the inside had been removed, and they identified traces of 
blood and hair.  In 1993, through the use of DNA technology, 
police were able to connect Kelly to the blood found on the 
mattress and the bureau seized from the McBrides’ residence.  
On November 4, 1999, a grand jury convened to investigate 
Kelly’s disappearance, and subsequently recommended 
charging McBride for Kelly’s murder.  Sixteen years after 
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Kelly’s disappearance, McBride was arrested in Florida and 
charged with criminal homicide. 
 
B. Procedural History 
 
1. Trial 
 
At McBride’s trial in the Court of Common Pleas of 
Northampton County in Pennsylvania in May 2001, the 
district attorney made comments before the jury that arguably 
implicated McBride’s constitutional right to remain silent.  
The district attorney made those comments, with no objection 
from McBride’s counsel, when referring to interviews that 
McBride had had with Richard Fritz, an FBI agent, and 
Stephen Abbey, a corporal in the Rockledge, Florida Police 
Department. 
 
a) Agent Fritz Interviews 
 
Agent Fritz testified that he interviewed McBride 
twice during May 1984, and he read to the jury from notes 
that he made during those interviews.  Before Agent Fritz 
read his notes from the second interview,3
                                              
3 Agent Fritz’s first interview with McBride occurred 
on May 1, 1984, when McBride voluntarily appeared at the 
FBI office in Allentown, Pennsylvania to provide information 
regarding Kelly’s disappearance.  McBride does not argue 
that any notes read from that first interview implicated his 
constitutional right to silence.   
 defense counsel 
objected on hearsay grounds.  The judge overruled that 
objection and gave a limiting instruction directing the jury to 
focus on McBride’s reactions to Agent Fritz’s questions: 
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This information is being submitted to 
you for a limited purpose. …  [I]t’s being 
offered to you, and may be considered by you, 
only so that you can evaluate the effect on Mr. 
McBride when he hears these things.  It’s 
offered to show the effect on the listener, on the 
hearer.  So when there is a reference in the 
upcoming interview about things other people 
said, you’re not to focus on whether or not they 
actually said those things or whether or not 
those things are true.  Rather, you’re to focus on 
how, if at all, Mr. McBride reacts to that 
information. 
(App. at 176-77.)   
 
Agent Fritz then read his notes from a May 30, 1984 
interview with McBride at the Lehigh County Prison, where 
McBride was incarcerated on an unrelated matter.  Those 
notes indicated that, after Miranda warnings were given,4
 
 
McBride answered certain questions that Agent Fritz posed to 
him, but he did not respond to others: 
When specifically asked whether he had 
been in the company of [name redacted] the day 
following his wife’s disappearance, McBride 
would not answer. 
                                              
4 Specifically, Agent Fritz testified that McBride was 
“furnished an interrogation advised of rights form” and that 
“McBride stated he understood the form and its contents.”  
(App. at 177.) 
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McBride was asked if he was aware of 
the fact that [what appeared to be] a large 
amount of blood … had been found on a 
mattress in his apartment.  McBride would not 
respond. 
 McBride was asked whether he had any 
knowledge of a foot locker or a trunk previously 
located in his attic, and McBride stated he had 
no such knowledge.  He was asked whether he 
knew where a sleeping bag of his was located, 
and he would not answer. 
 McBride was asked whether he had ever 
been involved in the assault or murder of his 
wife.  McBride denied any such knowledge, 
indicated that he loved his wife. McBride was 
asked whether the blood located in his 
apartment could have been caused by the death 
of his wife or an assault on her person.  
McBride did not respond. 
 McBride then sat in complete silence for 
several moments and then indicated that he did 
not wish to continue the interview.  McBride 
abruptly left the interview space, and the 
interview was terminated. 
(Id. at 183-84.)  Defense counsel did not object to that 
testimony.5
                                              
5 The topic of Agent Fritz’s May 30, 1984 interview 
also arose when the district attorney cross-examined 
McBride: 
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Q. Now, Mr. Fritz says, when he was talking 
with you, on May 30th of 1984, McBride was 
asked whether he had been involved in the 
assault and murder of his wife, McBride denied 
any such knowledge, indicated he loved his 
wife, is that what you told him? 
A. I don’t recall, sir. 
Q. McBride was asked whether the blood 
located in his apartment could have been caused 
by the death of his wife or an assault on his 
person, McBride did not respond, do you 
remember that? 
A. No, sir, I don’t. 
Q. Is Agent Fritz wrong that you didn’t respond 
when he asked you that? 
A. I don’t recall what I told Mr. Fritz. 
(App. at 245-46.)  Defense counsel did not object to that 
testimony either.  In McBride’s 56-page petition for post-
conviction relief to the state court, see infra Part I.B.2, he 
made only a few passing references to that line of 
questioning.  Indeed, it was so obscure that the state court 
appears to have missed it, as its 28-page opinion on 
McBride’s post-conviction relief motion did not address that 
particular portion of the trial.  See id.  Assuming arguendo 
that McBride “fairly presented” in state court a claim related 
to that cross-examination, see Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 
700, 725 (3d Cir. 2005)  (describing “fairly presented” as 
meaning “that a petitioner must present a federal claim’s 
factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that 
puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted” 
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b) Officer Abbey Interview 
 
When McBride testified at trial, the district attorney 
cross-examined him regarding an interview with Officer 
Abbey that occurred after McBride’s arrest in 2000.  Having 
heard his Miranda rights, McBride had been willing to 
answer some of Officer Abbey’s questions but not others.  
The district attorney and McBride sparred during cross-
examination over just how much McBride had been willing to 
say in that interview: 
 
Q. Well, Mr. McBride, you agreed to talk to 
Officer Abbey, didn’t you? 
                                                                                                     
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), we would 
ordinarily review it de novo, since it was not “adjudicated on 
the merits,” Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 
2009).  Here, however, McBride only references this colloquy 
in a footnote in his opening brief, and therefore has failed 
even to adequately raise the issue before us.  See United 
States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting 
a “one-sentence footnote falls far short of meeting the 
requirement that an appellant raise an issue in his opening 
brief or else waive the issue on appeal”); Laborers’ Int’l 
Union of N.A. v. Foster Wheeler Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its 
opening brief, and for those purposes a passing reference to 
an issue … will not suffice to bring that issue before this 
court.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Accordingly, McBride has waived any claim related to this 
line of questioning, and we will not further address it. 
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A. No, I agreed to listen to him. 
Q. You answered his questions? 
A. A couple. 
Q. What do you mean, a couple, do you want 
me to go through every question and answer in 
this tape? 
A. If you like to, I don’t really mind. 
Q. You answered every one of his questions, 
didn’t you? 
A. Not every one, no. 
(Id. at 240.)  Defense counsel did not object to that testimony.   
 
McBride was ultimately convicted of first degree 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, and that judgment 
was affirmed by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.  
McBride’s Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court was denied.   
 
2. PCRA Appeal 
 
McBride filed a pro se petition for post-conviction 
relief, and, following the appointment of counsel, filed an 
amended petition pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Post Conviction 
Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Const. Stat. §§ 9541-46, in the 
Court of Common Pleas (in the context of the PCRA claim, 
the “PCRA Trial Court”).  He asserted that his trial counsel 
was ineffective for failing to object to the district attorney’s 
references to his post-arrest silence.  McBride’s trial counsel 
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testified at a hearing before the PCRA Trial Court and was 
asked whether the direct examination of Agent Fritz 
regarding the May 30, 1984 interview with McBride 
implicated McBride’s constitutional right to remain silent.  
He answered: 
 
 No, I disagree.  First of all, Mr. McBride 
did not elect to remain silent.  Mr. McBride had 
given a very extensive interview on May 1st, in 
which he had explained in detail to the same 
FBI agent[, Agent Fritz,] what he knew about it. 
 In the second interview [with Agent 
Fritz], Mr. McBride did not assert his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent, Mr. McBride 
answered questions.  What I gathered from that 
and what I felt that the jury would gather from 
that is that when it shifted from asking 
questions to becoming essentially accusatory 
towards Mr. McBride, that Mr. McBride wisely 
– first of all, had no response and eventually 
said this interview is over and stopped 
speaking. 
 I did not believe that to be an improper 
comment on his assertion of a Fifth Amendment 
assertion.  Rather, I felt it to be an example of 
how this investigation had proceeded or more to 
the point, not proceeded. 
 They were always looking at McBride, 
as best I could see, no matter what he said or 
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did and I thought it was a perfect example of 
how this had been badly investigated. 
 So I – in answer to your question, I’m 
sure that one could say that by not responding, 
as I recall the testimony to have been, or by not 
answering, he may have been asserting a Fifth 
Amendment right, although he doesn’t 
specifically say that. 
 But it also, in my view, was a rather 
dramatic way to point out to the jury exactly 
what was happening here; namely, that within a 
matter of months, they were focusing on him, 
even though they had no reason to.  
(App. at 273-74.)   
 
McBride’s PCRA counsel immediately asked 
McBride’s trial counsel whether he would “agree, that the 
testimony, at the least, refers to post[-Miranda] silence.”  (Id. 
at 274.)  McBride’s trial counsel answered, “I believe it is a 
reference to post[-Miranda] silence, clearly.”  (Id. at 275.)  
He then noted:  
 
 Obviously, in retrospect, I wish that 
many things had gone differently in this case.  
[The reference to post-Miranda silence] may 
not have been as beneficial [as] I thought it was 
at the time.  I would have to say, though, that at 
the time, this was a conscious decision to let 
Agent Fritz say what he was saying … .    
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(Id. at 277.)  
 
McBride’s PCRA counsel then asked McBride’s trial 
counsel whether he believed the district attorney’s line of 
questioning regarding Officer Abbey’s interview during the 
cross-examination of McBride implicated post-Miranda 
silence, “although perhaps less directly.”  (Id. at 280.)  He 
answered: “To the contrary.  I think it’s a question seeking to 
elicit a response from Mr. McBride that he had answered the 
questions put to him by Officer Abbey, that’s the way that I 
understood that testimony.”  (Id.) 
 
After the hearing, the PCRA Trial Court denied 
McBride’s petition.  Regarding the challenged references 
made during Agent Fritz’s testimony, the PCRA Trial Court 
concluded that McBride had failed to prove that trial counsel 
was ineffective.  Although the PCRA Trial Court found that 
McBride’s “claim ha[d] arguable merit” (id. at 310), the 
Court said that, “[a]fter a review of the testimony and trial 
strategy,” it could not conclude that trial counsel’s “actions 
were without a reasonable basis to effectuate his client’s 
interests” (id. at 311).6
                                              
6 In rejecting the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim, the PCRA Trial Court applied a three prong test, citing 
to Commonwealth v. Harris, 852 A.2d 1168 (Pa. 2004); see 
id. at 1173 (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 
213 (Pa. 1987)) (“To succeed on a claim that counsel was 
ineffective, an appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the 
underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no 
reasonable basis for the act or omission in question; and (3) 
he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient 
performance, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that, but 
  The Court went on to note that trial 
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counsel “[was] a well known and very experienced criminal 
defense attorney” in the county and had “made some strategic 
choices in furtherance of the defense theme.  The mere fact 
that [trial counsel’s] trial strategy was ultimately unsuccessful 
does not render it unreasonable.”  (Id.)   
 
Concerning the line of questioning that arose during 
cross-examination of McBride about his interview with 
Officer Abbey, the PCRA Trial Court concluded that the 
exchange “d[id] not implicate any post-arrest silence.”  (Id. at 
314.)  Rather, “[t]he record show[ed] that [McBride] 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his [Miranda] rights and 
agreed to answer the questions of … Abbey.  The prosecution 
was merely conducting a cross-examination of [McBride] as 
to his voluntary responses to [those] questions.”  (Id.)   
 
McBride appealed to the Superior Court (in the context 
of the PCRA claim, the “PCRA Appellate Court”), which 
affirmed the PCRA Trial Court’s order.  Although the PCRA 
Appellate Court found that McBride “raised an issue of 
arguable merit” regarding trial counsel’s failure to object 
during Agent Fritz’s testimony (id. at 392), and noted that 
“the reasonableness of counsel’s choice not to object 
present[ed] a difficult question” (id. at 393), it concluded that 
McBride “suffered no prejudice from the testimonial 
references to his post-Miranda silence” (App. at 396).  
Because it rested its conclusion on lack of prejudice, the 
                                                                                                     
for counsel’s error, the outcome of the proceeding would be 
different.”).  We have held that the three prong test laid out in 
Pierce does not “contradict[] the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)].”  Werts v. 
Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 204 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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PCRA Appellate Court did not analyze whether trial 
counsel’s decision not to object during the direct examination 
of Agent Fritz was reasonable.7
 
  In concluding that there was 
“no reasonable possibility that the outcome of the trial would 
have been different absent Agent Fritz’s testimonial 
references to [McBride]’s silence” (id.), the PCRA Appellate 
Court cited to what it thought were factual recitations from 
three witnesses at McBride’s trial: 
 In May, 1984, Judith Seagraves, a 
neighbor of the McBrides, called the 
Northampton Police to report that [McBride], 
[McBride]’s father Robert McBride, and 
[McBride]’s landlord were removing a bloody 
mattress from [McBride]’s apartment. … 
…. 
 At [McBride]’s trial, Dawn DeLong 
testified that she was at the McBride’s home 
one night in early 1984 and observed the couple 
“play fighting.”  At one point, [McBride] struck 
Kelly McBride, who fell and hit her head 
against a coffee table.  DeLong stated that she 
saw no blood at the time, and that [McBride] 
carried Kelly upstairs.  When DeLong went 
upstairs approximately one hour later to use the 
bathroom, she passed a bedroom where she saw 
                                              
7 The PCRA Appellate Court also did not discuss the 
district attorney’s cross-examination of McBride regarding 
the Officer Abbey interview.  
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[McBride] holding Kelly.  She observed that 
Kelly appeared unconscious, and that there was 
blood all over the mattress and Kelly’s hair.  
DeLong testified that [McBride] seemed 
nervous and upset, and appeared to be trying to 
stuff Kelly’s body into a dresser from which the 
drawers had been removed.  [McBride] then 
asked DeLong to retrieve a knife from the 
kitchen, and she complied.  DeLong testified 
that she also saw [McBride] retrieve a handsaw 
from the basement and return with it to the 
bedroom.  DeLong testified that the last time 
she saw Kelly was when she saw [McBride] 
holding Kelly in the bedroom. 
 Another witness, Annette Beck, testified 
at trial that she had conversations with 
[McBride] regarding his marital status in 1987 
and 1988.  She stated that while [McBride] 
originally told her that his wife had left him and 
filed for divorce, he subsequently told her, on 
numerous occasions, that he had killed his wife.  
When Beck asked [McBride] where his wife’s 
body was, he replied “where a back hoe 
wouldn’t fit, use a shovel.” 
(Id. at 394-95 (internal citation omitted).)   
 
Each of those recitations, however, contained 
significant mischaracterizations or omissions.  First, 
Seagraves testified that only McBride’s father and landlord 
were disposing of a bloody mattress on May 25, 1984, not 
McBride himself.  In fact, it had been stipulated that McBride 
was incarcerated on unrelated charges on that date.  Second, 
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DeLong never even testified at trial, but rather only at a 
preliminary hearing.  Indeed, the Commonwealth did not call 
her as a witness at trial because it believed she had fabricated 
her preliminary hearing testimony.  Finally, the PCRA 
Appellate Court failed to note that Beck said she understood 
McBride’s alleged confession to be a joke.   
 
Following the PCRA Appellate Court’s decision, 
McBride filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which was denied.   
 
3. Post-Conviction Relief in Federal Court 
 
McBride subsequently filed in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania a 
timely pro se petition for habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254.  A magistrate judge recommended denial of the 
petition.  After being appointed counsel, McBride was given 
the opportunity to file an amended petition, which he did.   
 
The District Court denied McBride’s petition for 
habeas relief.  The Court first addressed the references to 
post-Miranda silence that arose during direct examination of 
Agent Fritz, concluding that “the state courts’ ruling was not 
contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.”  
(App. at 19.)  Although the Court “[found] it troubling that 
trial counsel appear[ed] ambivalent about whether the 
testimonial references were improper or may have been the 
subject of a successful constitutional challenge,” the Court 
“d[id] not believe that such a conclusion constitute[d] 
ineffectiveness per se in light of counsel’s stated strategy of 
not challenging references to [McBride’s] silence because 
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that testimony was consistent with his defense theory.”8
 
  (Id. 
at 19-20.) 
The District Court then turned to the line of 
questioning that arose during the cross-examination of 
McBride regarding his interview with Officer Abbey.  The 
Court found that “the context of [McBride’s] statement [was 
not] one in which jurors would equate invocation of Fifth 
Amendment rights with an implicit admission of guilt.”  (Id. 
at 28.)  Therefore, the Court concluded that counsel’s failure 
to object did not “fall outside of the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance.”  (Id. at 29 (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).)  Accordingly, the Court 
issued an order denying the petition and refusing to grant a 
certificate of appealability (“COA”).  We granted a COA 
“limited to the following issue: whether trial counsel rendered 
constitutionally ineffective assistance when he failed to object 
to references at trial to [McBride]’s constitutionally protected 
silence.”  (App. at 44.) 
                                              
8 Because the District Court found that “trial 
counsel[’s] stated explanation of his trial strategy was 
constitutionally sufficient” (App. at 21), it did not address 
whether McBride was prejudiced by the challenged 
references.  It did note, however, the mischaracterizations and 
omissions made by the PCRA Appellate Court, and did not 
rely on any of them in reaching its decision to deny habeas 
relief.   
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II. Discussion9
 
 
As already noted, McBride claims that his trial counsel 
was ineffective by failing to object to various references at 
trial that he alleges implicated his constitutional right to 
remain silent.  He argues that those failures were not “a result 
of any conscious decision or strategy, but because [his trial 
counsel] erroneously believed the testimony to be 
permissible.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 22.)  McBride asserts that 
“because the state court incorrectly found … that [his] [t]rial 
[c]ounsel’s unconscious, uninformed and unreasonable 
decision was not deficient and prejudicial,” we should grant 
him habeas relief.  (Id. at 23.)  Before we can opine on that 
argument, we must first consider the analytical context 
provided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), by Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984), and by the Fifth Amendment. 
 
A. AEDPA 
 
The parties agree that we are bound by the standards of 
AEDPA, under which a federal court may not grant a writ of 
habeas corpus with respect to a claim that was adjudicated on 
the merits in state court proceedings unless the state courts’ 
adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established 
                                              
9 The District Court had jurisdiction over McBride’s 
amended petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253 
and, because the District Court did not conduct an evidentiary 
hearing, our standard of review is plenary.  McMullen v. 
Tennis, 562 F.3d 231, 236 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the 
United States.”10
                                              
10 “[A]n adjudication on the merits can occur at any 
level of state court.”  Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 115 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Here, the 
PCRA Trial Court affirmed on the basis that trial counsel’s 
performance was not constitutionally deficient, and the PCRA 
Appellate Court affirmed due to a lack of prejudice, without 
ruling explicitly on the performance prong of Strickland.  On 
the basis of our opinion in Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256 (3d 
Cir. 2008), it can be argued that each of those rulings was the 
last reasoned opinion of a state court reaching the merits of a 
particular prong of Strickland and that we must therefore 
consider both of them under the deferential AEDPA standard.  
See id. at 289 (reviewing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s 
decision on PCRA review for the first prong of the Strickland 
analysis, but reviewing the PCRA trial court’s decision for 
Strickland’s second prong).  It can also be argued, however, 
that this case differs from Bond in that we noted there that the 
state appellate court “agreed” with the PCRA trial court’s 
denial of relief, id. at 284; Commonwealth v. Bond, 819 A.2d 
33, 45 (Pa. 2002) (“We find no error in the PCRA [trial] 
court’s denial of relief”), while in this case the state appellate 
court did not adopt, incorporate, or embrace the PCRA Trial 
Court’s reasoning.  It only noted that the performance prong 
“presents a difficult question.”  (App. at 393.) 
  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).  Also, under the 
We do not have to resolve the meaning of Bond in this 
case, however, because McBride has affirmatively taken the 
position that AEDPA deference applies.  (See Appellant’s Br. 
at 20 (“Mr. McBride’s habeas petition is governed by 
[AEDPA].”); id. at 24 (“Because the state court unreasonably 
applied Strickland to the facts of this case, a writ of habeas 
20 
 
                                                                                                     
corpus should issue.”).)  Because McBride “has not argued 
that § 2254(d) is entirely inapplicable to his claim or that the 
state court failed to reach an adjudication on the merits,” we 
proceed to “evaluate his claim through the deferential lens of 
§ 2254(d).”  Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 121 n.2 
(2009) (applying AEDPA deference to petitioner’s claim 
because, before the Supreme Court, he “contend[ed] that the 
Court of Appeals correctly applied § 2254(d) to his claim,” 
despite his having previously, before the court of appeals, 
“contended that the standard of review set forth in 
§ 2254(d)(1) should not apply to his case”); Childers v. 
Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 967 n.15 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(noting that “the Supreme Court has suggested that habeas 
petitioners can waive [his or her right to argue that a state 
court decision was not an adjudication on the merits]” (citing 
Knowles, 556 U.S. at 121 n.2)).  Thus, regardless of whether 
we are required to give AEDPA deference to the PCRA Trial 
Court’s analysis of the performance prong, we do give it 
deference as a reasoned analysis to which McBride has 
acknowledged AEDPA applies.  Cf. Harrington v. Richter, 
131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (stating that we “must determine 
what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have 
supported, the state court’s decision; and then … must ask 
whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that 
those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding 
in a prior decision of [the Supreme Court]”).   
We are thus spared the need to delve into the 
complicated question of what effect, if any, the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 
770, has had on the teachings from Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 534 (2003), Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 
(2005), and Porter v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. 447, 452 (2009).  
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In holding that an unexplained state court decision must be 
accorded AEDPA deference, Richter observed that 
“§ 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim,’ not a component of one, 
has been adjudicated,” regardless of “whether or not the state 
court reveals which of the elements in a multipart claim it 
found insufficient.”  131 S. Ct. at 784.  That observation 
arguably undermines the principle from Wiggins and its 
progeny that instructs that de novo review should apply to a 
particular prong of Strickland “when neither of the state 
courts below reached [that particular prong].”  Wiggins, 539 
U.S. at 534;  Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 390 (“Because the state 
courts found the representation adequate, they never reached 
the issue of prejudice, and so we examine this element of the 
Strickland claim de novo.” (internal citation omitted)); Porter 
v. McCollum, 130 S. Ct. at 452.  That issue – whether 
Wiggins and related cases can co-exist with Richter – appears 
to be generating some conflict among our sister circuits.  
Compare Childers, 642 F.3d at 969 n.18 (“Language in 
[Richter] … suggests that [the principle of reviewing a 
component of a claim that was not adjudicated on the merits 
de novo] may no longer be good law”), with Sussman v. 
Jenkins, 642 F.3d 532, 534 (7th Cir. 2011) (one-judge order 
denying motion to stay) (“[T]he Supreme Court in [Richter] 
did not disturb its approach in Wiggins … [and] [w]e 
certainly cannot assume that the Court overruled sub silentio 
its holding in Wiggins – a precedent so important to the daily 
work of the lower federal courts.”) and Rayner v. Mills, __ 
F.3d __, 2012 WL 2855803, *3-4 (6th Cir. July 12, 2012) 
(“The Wiggins and Rompilla line of cases work together with 
[Richter] to ensure application of AEDPA deference to an 
entire ineffective assistance claim.”).  Our own views on the 
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AEDPA standard, the “[s]tate court[s’] relevant factual 
determinations are presumed to be correct unless the 
petitioner rebuts [that] presumption by clear and convincing 
evidence.”  Han Tak Lee v. Glunt, 667 F.3d 397, 403 (3d Cir. 
2012) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).     
 
Since McBride does not assert that the state courts’ 
adjudication was contrary to Supreme Court precedent, but 
rather contends only that the state courts unreasonably 
applied that precedent, we will focus only on the 
“unreasonable application” prong of § 2254(d)(1).  In other 
words, to obtain habeas relief, McBride “must show that the 
state court[s’] ruling on the claims being presented in federal 
court was so lacking in justification [under Supreme Court 
precedent] that there was an error well understood and 
comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for 
fairminded disagreement.”  Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 
770, 786-87 (2011).  “[E]valuating whether a rule application 
was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity.  
The more general the rule, the more leeway [state] courts 
have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”  
Id. at 786 (alteration in original) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “[I]t is not an unreasonable 
application of clearly established Federal law for a state court 
to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been 
squarely established by [the Supreme Court].”  Id. (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  In the end, “[i]f this 
                                                                                                     
possible tension between these Supreme Court precedents can 
be expressed on another day. 
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standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to 
be.”  Id.   
 
B. Strickland and AEDPA 
 
McBride specifically asserts that the state courts 
unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington to the facts of 
his case.  In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that every 
criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to 
“reasonably effective [legal] assistance.” 466 U.S. at 687.  To 
succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
McBride must show that his “counsel’s performance was 
deficient,” id., that is, he must prove that “counsel’s 
representation fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness,” id. at 688.  In scrutinizing counsel’s 
performance, we “must be highly deferential,” and refrain 
from “second-guess[ing] counsel’s assistance after conviction 
or adverse sentence, [as] it is all too easy for a court, 
examining counsel’s defense after it has proved unsuccessful, 
to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was 
unreasonable.”  Id. at 689.  We must “eliminate the distorting 
effects of hindsight,” and “indulge a strong presumption that 
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance.”  Id.  Deficient performance can only 
be found when “counsel made errors so serious that counsel 
was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed … by the 
Sixth Amendment.”11
                                              
11 Even after establishing deficient performance, a 
defendant must also show that the “deficient performance 
prejudiced the defense.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.  To 
prove prejudice, a defendant must show “a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
  Id. at 687. 
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The Supreme Court in Richter discussed how to assess 
a Strickland claim in the AEDPA context: 
                                                                                                     
result of the proceeding would have been different.  A 
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome.”  Id. at 694.  Counsel’s deficient 
performance must be “so serious as to deprive the defendant 
of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”   Id. at 687.   
As discussed supra note 10, the PCRA Appellate 
Court did not address the performance component of 
Strickland, because it determined that McBride could not 
show that counsel’s performance prejudiced him.  Although 
the PCRA Appellate Court’s prejudice is, unfortunately, 
marred by serious mischaracterizations of the record, we 
agree with our concurring colleague that “we still owe the 
[PCRA Appellate Court’s] holding deference if it applied 
Strickland reasonably.” (Concurrence Slip Op. at 1.)  See 
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784 (stating that § 2254 “applies when a 
‘claim,’ not a component of one, has been adjudicated”); see 
also supra note 10.  Unlike our concurring colleague, 
however, we do not think the question of whether “McBride 
was … sufficiently prejudiced by the introduction of 
testimony that referenced [his] silence during interrogation” 
(Concurrence Slip Op. at 1) can readily be answered one way 
or another, and do not believe that we can assume that the 
PCRA Appellate Court would have come to the same 
conclusion that it did had it understood the facts correctly.  
We need not delve into that speculation, though, because we 
accord AEDPA deference to the PCRA Trial Court’s analysis 
of the performance prong, see supra note 10, and that analysis 
cannot readily be doubted under that statute’s stringent 
standards, see infra note 13 and accompanying text. 
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 The pivotal question is whether the state 
court’s application of the Strickland standard 
was unreasonable. This is different from asking 
whether defense counsel’s performance fell 
below Strickland’s standard.  Were that the 
inquiry, the analysis would be no different than 
if, for example, this Court were adjudicating a 
Strickland claim on direct review of a criminal 
conviction in a United States district court.  
Under AEDPA, though, it is a necessary 
premise that the two questions are different.  
For purposes of § 2254(d)(1), an unreasonable 
application of federal law is different from an 
incorrect application of federal law.  A state 
court must be granted a deference and latitude 
that are not in operation when the case involves 
review under the Strickland standard itself.  
Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 785 (internal citation and quotation 
marks omitted).  The Richter court noted that even under a de 
novo review of Strickland, counsel’s representation should be 
judged under a “most deferential” standard because, “[u]nlike 
a later reviewing court, [trial counsel] observed the relevant 
proceedings, knew of materials outside the record, and 
interacted with the client, with opposing counsel, and with the 
judge.”  Id. at 788.  In that light, the Richter court held that, 
under AEDPA, Strickland’s “high bar” becomes even more 
difficult to surmount: 
 
 Establishing that a state court’s 
application of Strickland was unreasonable 
under § 2254(d) is all the more difficult.  The 
standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) 
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are both highly deferential, and when the two 
apply in tandem, review is doubly so.  The 
Strickland standard is a general one, so the 
range of reasonable applications is substantial.  
Federal habeas courts must guard against the 
danger of equating unreasonableness under 
Strickland with unreasonableness under 
§ 2254(d). When § 2254(d) applies, the 
question is not whether counsel’s actions were 
reasonable.  The question is whether there is 
any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied 
Strickland’s deferential standard. 
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).  
 
C. Constitutional Right to Silence 
 
Because McBride asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective by failing to object to certain references to his 
silence – references that he alleges were in violation of his 
constitutional right to remain silent – we must consider as a 
threshold matter when the constitutional right to silence is 
implicated.  “The Fifth Amendment, which applies to the 
States by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that 
‘[n]o person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be 
a witness against himself.’”  Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 
1213, 1219 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S. 
Const. amend. V).  Warnings provided by law enforcement 
officials pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 
(1966), provide “a prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth 
Amendment rights.”  Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 
(1976); see id. at 619 (concluding that the use of a 
defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach that defendant’s 
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exculpatory testimony violated the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  We have explained that: 
 
 Once a criminal defendant receives the 
prophylactic warnings required by Miranda …, 
it is improper under Doyle for a prosecutor to 
cause the jury to draw an impermissible 
inference of guilt from a defendant’s post-arrest 
silence.  This is so because Miranda warnings 
carry the Government’s implicit assurance that 
an arrestee’s invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent will not later 
be used against him. Because a defendant’s 
post-Miranda warning silence could be nothing 
more than an invocation of his right to silence, 
it would be fundamentally unfair to permit a 
breach of that assurance by allowing 
impeaching questions as to why he failed to 
give an exculpatory account to the police after 
receiving the warnings. 
Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).12
                                              
12 In Martinez, the defendant, charged with kidnapping 
for rape, testified that the sexual encounter at issue was 
consensual and that his victim threatened to tell others that he 
raped her unless he gave her money.  620 F.3d at 333.  “The 
government sought to dispel Martinez’s exculpatory account 
on cross-examination,” asking him whether he had previously 
made a similar statement to an officer involved in arresting 
him, id., or “anyone” else, id. at 333-34.  Martinez alleged 
that line of questioning violated Doyle.  Id. at 335.  We could 
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“Not every reference to a defendant’s silence, 
however, results in a Doyle violation.”  Id.  Here, McBride 
answered some of the questions posed to him subsequent to 
receiving Miranda warnings, but selectively chose not to 
answer others.  Many courts characterize this issue as partial 
or selective silence and have differing views on whether such 
silence should be admissible at trial against a defendant.  
While we have never considered the issue, some of our sister 
circuits have held that Miranda and Doyle protect a 
defendant’s partial or selective silence from being used 
against him at trial.  See Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 
1087 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A suspect may remain selectively 
silent by answering some questions and then refusing to 
answer others without taking the risk that his silence may be 
used against him at trial.”); United States v. May, 52 F.3d 
885, 890 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[R]ecogniz[ing] that when a 
                                                                                                     
not “discern whether [the] question [regarding the defendant’s 
statements to the officer]… violated Doyle” because that 
officer “did not testify at trial, and the record [did] not 
disclose what role he played in Martinez’s arrest, or whether 
Martinez’s failure to give the exculpatory story to him 
occurred before or after the arrest, or before or after Miranda 
warnings had been given.”  Id. at 336.  Concerning the 
question “whether Martinez had ever told ‘anyone’ his 
exculpatory account,” id., we “[thought] that … questioning 
… approached the constitutional line, and likely crossed it,” 
id. at. 337.  However, we did “not decide definitively whether 
the [g]overnment’s questions violated Doyle, because” we 
concluded that “any Doyle violation … was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt.”  Id.  Thus, any observations that we 
made in Martinez regarding Doyle were not necessary to our 
decision.   
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defendant is ‘partially silent’ by answering some questions 
and refusing to answer others, this partial silence does not 
preclude him from claiming a violation of his due process 
rights under Doyle.”); United States v. Scott, 47 F.3d 904, 907 
(7th Cir. 1995) (“[A] suspect may speak to the agents, 
reassert his right to remain silent or refuse to answer certain 
questions, and still be confident that Doyle will prevent the 
prosecution from using his silence against him.”).  Other 
circuit courts, however, have held that a defendant has no 
constitutional right to prevent his selective silence from being 
used against him at trial.  See United States v. Pando Franco, 
503 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir. 2007) (“[C]onclud[ing] that[,] by 
answering … questions after having knowingly received 
proper Miranda warnings, [the defendant] waived his right to 
[prevent] the entire conversation, including the implicit 
references to his silence contained therein, [from being] used 
against him as substantive evidence of guilt.”); United States 
v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he admission 
of [the defendant’s] silence in response to one question posed 
to him in the midst of his interrogation was [not] a violation 
of the Supreme Court’s holding in Doyle.”).  Cf. United States 
v. Andujar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 556 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(distinguishing Burns on the basis that “the challenged 
testimony [at issue in Burns] mentioned only the defendant’s 
refusal to answer further questions,” whereas “the challenged 
testimony [at issue in Andujar-Basco]  refer[red] directly to 
[the defendant’s] express assertion of his constitutional 
rights,” because “although silence may be interpreted in many 
ways …, the affirmative assertion of the privilege against 
self-incrimination raises a clear inference of culpability” 
(internal citation omitted)).  In short, it cannot be said that 
“clearly established Federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), 
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prevents a defendant’s selective silence from being used 
against that defendant at trial.13
                                              
13 In light of those differing views, we cannot agree 
with our concurring colleague that McBride’s trial counsel 
necessarily “could [have made] a successful constitutional 
objection at trial” regarding the admission of McBride’s 
statements.  (Concurrence Slip. Op. at 1.) 
 
That is particularly true, given the Supreme Court’s 
statement in a habeas case that “an accused who wants to 
invoke his or her right to remain silent [must] do so 
unambiguously.”  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 
2260 (2010).  In Thompkins, the defendant, after receiving 
Miranda warnings, remained largely silent during an 
interrogation that lasted approximately three hours.  Id. at 
2256.  About two hours and 45 minutes into that 
interrogation, however, Thompkins made inculpatory 
statements.  Id. at 2257.  Prior to trial, he moved to suppress 
those statements, arguing “that he had invoked his Fifth 
Amendment right to remain silent, requiring the police to end 
the interrogation at once.”  Id.  The trial court denied that 
motion and Thompkins was subsequently convicted, and that 
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.  Id. at 2257-58.  
After he filed a habeas petition, the district court denied 
relief, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit reversed, holding “that the state court was 
unreasonable in finding an implied waiver.”  Id. at 2258.  The 
Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.  Because 
Thompkins “did not say that he wanted to remain silent or 
that he did not want to talk,” but rather just remained silent, 
the Supreme Court concluded that “he [had] not invoke[d] his 
right to remain silent.”  Id. at 2260.  Therefore, the Court held 
that police could further interrogate him, and, since the Court 
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D. Analysis of Strickland Claim Under AEDPA 
 
McBride argues that trial counsel’s failure to object to 
numerous references that may have implicated his 
constitutional right to remain silent fell outside of the wide 
range of professional competent assistance contemplated in 
Strickland, because, according to McBride, his trial counsel 
“clearly did not make a strategic decision to allow the jury to 
hear references to [those] silences.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 26.)  
                                                                                                     
also held that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent by 
his subsequent inculpatory statements, such statements were 
properly admitted at trial.  Id. at 2260-64.   In light of 
Thompkins’ holding that a defendant’s silence during an 
interrogation does not invoke his or her right to silence, the 
circumstances in which simply remaining silent suffices to 
prevent that silence from being used at trial under the Doyle 
rule are not free from doubt.  But cf. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-
18 (“Silence in the wake of [Miranda] warnings may be 
nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of … [Miranda] 
rights. ...  Moreover, while it is true that the [Miranda] 
warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry 
no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who 
receives the warnings.”); Hurd, 619 F.3d at 1088 (finding that 
“Thompkins stands for the proposition that a voluntary 
confession should not be suppressed just because a defendant 
has refrained from answering other questions,” but noting that 
Thompkins “does not alter the fundamental principle that a 
suspect’s silence in the face of questioning cannot be used as 
evidence against him at trial, whether that silence would 
constitute a valid invocation of the ‘right to cut off 
questioning’ or not” (quoting Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. at 
2260)). 
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Under AEDPA, our review asks whether the PCRA Trial 
Court’s determination – that trial counsel’s actions were not 
without a reasonable basis – “was so lacking in justification 
that there was an error well understood and comprehended in 
existing [Supreme Court precedent] beyond any possibility 
for fairminded disagreement.”  Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786-87.  
The PCRA Trial Court’s decision was not so lacking here. 
 
 1. Agent Fritz 
 
Regarding the direct examination of Agent Fritz, the 
PCRA Trial Court determined that trial counsel’s decision not 
to object to references to McBride’s post-Miranda silence by 
Agent Fritz was not “without a reasonable basis to effectuate 
his client’s interests.”  (App. at 311.)  McBride argues that 
that conclusion is unsound because trial counsel “did not even 
know that [McBride] had effectively asserted his Fifth 
Amendment right, that testimony about it was impermissible, 
and that he could and should have objected.”  (Appellant’s 
Br. at 28.)  In short, he says there was not a “‘strategic’ 
decision not to object.”  (Id.) 
 
As an initial matter, it is debatable whether the 
admission of the disputed references to McBride’s selective 
silence was a violation of Miranda or Doyle.14
                                              
14 It may also be debatable whether McBride ever 
asserted his right to remain silent to prevent the challenged 
references from being used against him at trial in 
contravention of Miranda.  See supra note 
  See, e.g., 
Burns, 276 F.3d at 442 (“[W]here the accused initially waives 
his or her right to remain silent and agrees to questioning, but 
subsequently refuses to answer further questions, the 
13. 
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prosecution may note the refusal because it now constitutes 
part of an otherwise admissible conversation between the 
police and the accused.” (citation and internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  Thus, although the District Court found it 
“troubling that trial counsel [at the PCRA hearing] appear[ed] 
ambivalent about whether the testimonial references were 
improper or may have been the subject of a successful 
constitutional challenge”15
                                              
15 At oral argument, counsel for Appellees, for the first 
time, alerted us to a pre-trial motion to suppress filed by 
McBride’s trial counsel that, Appellees allege, supports the 
assertion that trial counsel was aware that statements to be 
used at trial from certain interviews McBride had with law 
enforcement may have implicated post-Miranda silence.  
Considering each party’s letters submitted pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), as well as a supplemental 
appendix provided by McBride’s appellate counsel, it appears 
that trial counsel only moved to suppress affirmative 
statements made by McBride during the Officer Abbey 
interview.  There is no indication from that motion to 
suppress, the related briefs, or the state court’s order denying 
the motion to suppress, that McBride’s trial counsel was 
aware that the references now at issue – either in the Agent 
Fritz interview or in the Officer Abbey interview – implicated 
post-Miranda silence.  Accordingly, we do not rely on that 
motion to support our holding here. 
 (App. at 19-20; compare id. at 273 
(“Mr. McBride did not assert his Fifth Amendment right to 
remain silent,” and “I did not believe that to be an improper 
comment on his assertion of a Fifth Amendment right.”) with 
id. at 274 (“I’m sure that one could say that by not responding 
, … or by not answering, he may have been asserting a Fifth 
Amendment right, although he doesn’t specifically say that.”) 
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and id. at 275 (“I believe it is a reference to post[-Miranda] 
silence, clearly.”)), there is at least a reasonable argument that 
such references may not have even been constitutionally 
impermissible.16
 
 
In that light, we also note that trial counsel 
emphatically asserted at the PCRA hearing that his decision 
not to object to those references was a part of his trial 
strategy.  (See id. at 273 (noting that “what … the jury would 
gather from that [testimony] [was] that when it shifted from 
asking questions to becoming essentially accusatory toward 
Mr. McBride, that Mr. McBride wisely … had no response 
and eventually said this interview is over and stopped 
speaking”); id. at 274 (“[The testimony] was a rather dramatic 
way to point out to the jury what was happening here; 
namely, that within a matter of months, they were focusing on 
him, even though they had no reason to.”); id. at 276 (noting 
that he did not object because he “believed … it was part of 
the theory of the defense that the prosecution hadn’t really 
looked much further than James McBride ever”); id. at 278 
(“[W]hile in retrospect I’m not entirely comfortable with the 
decision, it was a decision that fit the defense theme.”).)  
Indeed, the PCRA Trial Court found that trial counsel “made 
some strategic choices in furtherance of the defense theme” 
                                              
16 Because there is a reasonable argument that not all 
references to post-Miranda silence result in a Doyle violation, 
it may not be inconsistent to say that the references implicate 
post-Miranda silence and, at the same time, say that they are 
not constitutionally impermissible.  We neither endorse nor 
refute such a contention but note it as pertinent to the question 
of whether the PCRA Trial Court unreasonably applied 
Strickland. 
35 
 
(id. at 311), a factual finding that we are bound to presume is 
correct because McBride has not rebutted it by clear and 
convincing evidence.17  See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).  Even 
though trial counsel’s strategy was ultimately unsuccessful, 
we must “eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight,” and 
“indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.  Recognizing that “the standards 
created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both highly 
deferential, and when the two apply in tandem, [our] review 
[should be] doubly so,” there is a “reasonable argument that 
counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”18
                                              
17 We acknowledge, generally, that if a defendant’s 
trial counsel is completely unaware that an obvious 
constitutional violation has occurred, it would be difficult to 
give the proper weight to a state court factual finding that 
justifies such deficiency by finding that trial counsel’s 
decision not to object was part of a trial strategy.  Here, 
however, it is not clear whether counsel was attuned to the 
constitutional issue, and, in that context, we must accord 
proper deference to the factual finding of the PCRA Trial 
Court that counsel made a strategic decision not to object. 
  
18 McBride downplays the highly deferential standard 
under which we review this claim, and cites to two pre-
AEDPA cases from our circuit that deal with an ineffective 
assistance of counsel allegation regarding failure to object to 
post-Miranda silence in the habeas context to support why we 
should grant relief here.  First, he distinguishes his case from 
Moore v. Deputy Commissioner(s) of SCI-Huntingdon, where 
we found counsel were not ineffective because they “were 
well aware that the references to post-arrest silence were 
improper,” but made “a conscious determination as to how to 
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Richter, 131 S. Ct. 788 (internal citations and quotation marks 
                                                                                                     
proceed,” 946 F.2d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 1991), whereas here, 
McBride alleges, no such conscious determination was made.  
Instead, he argues that the facts in Boyer v. Patton are 
analogous to his case.  579 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1978).  In 
Boyer, a pre-Strickland case, trial counsel admitted “that he 
could not recall any specific reason for his failure to 
challenge” testimony that violated his client’s Fifth 
Amendment right to silence.  Id. at 285.  We found that 
counsel’s failure to object to a reference to post-arrest silence, 
which trial counsel noted “might well be objectionable,” id. at 
285 (internal quotation marks omitted), fell below “the 
standard  of adequacy of legal services, … [which was] the 
exercise of the customary skill and knowledge which 
normally prevails at the time and place,” id. at 286 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).   
To analyze whether trial counsel’s failure to object 
here is more akin to Moore or Boyer misses the point.  
Rather, it is imperative to note that our standard of review in 
Moore was less deferential than is now required, see Moore, 
946 F.2d at 246 (de novo review under Strickland), and, in 
Boyer, even less so, see Boyer, 579 F.2d at 286 (whether 
attorney “exercise[d] … the customary skill and knowledge 
which normally prevails at the time and place” (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted)).  None of the state court 
decisions in those cases were accorded nearly the level of 
deference that more current precedent demands.  See Richter, 
131 S. Ct. at 788 (“When § 2254(d) applies, the question is 
not whether counsel’s actions were reasonable.  The question 
is whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel 
satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.”).   
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omitted).  Accordingly, the PCRA Trial Court’s 
determination here was not an unreasonable application of 
Strickland. 
 
 2. Officer Abbey 
 
The PCRA Trial Court also determined that trial 
counsel’s failure to object to a line of cross-examination 
questions regarding McBride’s interview with Officer Abbey 
did “not implicate any post-arrest silence” as “[t]he 
prosecution was merely conducting a cross-examination of 
[McBride] as to his voluntary responses to [those] questions.”  
(App. at 314.)  McBride disagrees, asserting that “this 
questioning clearly refers to post-Miranda silence” because 
“the [district attorney] obviously knew that McBride did not 
answer every question [posed by Officer Abbey],” and 
McBride’s admission that he had not done so “served the 
[district attorney’s] purpose of emphasizing his post-Miranda 
silence.”  (Appellant’s Br. at 32.)  Therefore, McBride claims, 
trial counsel’s decision not to object “f[ell] below the 
standard expected of competent counsel.”  (Id.) 
 
Under the “highly deferential” Strickland-plus- 
§ 2254(d) “tandem” review,  Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 788, there 
was at least a reasonable argument that trial counsel’s actions 
were within the “wide range of professionally competent 
assistance,” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.  Trial counsel 
testified at the PCRA hearing that he did not object to the line 
of questioning in dispute because he believed that it sought 
“to elicit a response from Mr. McBride that he had answered 
questions put to him by Officer Abbey.”  (App. at 280.)  
Indeed, when cross-examining Officer Abbey, trial counsel 
emphasized that McBride had repeatedly denied to Officer 
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Abbey that he participated in any wrongdoing involving his 
wife.  (See Notes of Testimony 5/10/01 at 96 (“Q. In fact, 
when specifically asked repeatedly as many different ways as 
you could, what he said was, I didn’t do it, right?  A.  That’s 
correct.”).)  Thus, it could be reasonably argued that the 
cross-examination of McBride regarding his interview with 
Officer Abbey was, as the District Court stated, “focused on 
[McBride’s] responses, and not [McBride’s] silence,” and 
therefore did not implicate any constitutionally impermissible 
inference of guilt.  (App. at 28.)  Accordingly, the PCRA 
Trial Court’s finding that such references “[did] not implicate 
any post-arrest silence” (App. at 314), and its implicit 
conclusion that trial counsel did not act unreasonably by not 
objecting, was not an unreasonable application of Strickland. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment 
of the District Court.   
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge concurring: 
 
 I concur with my colleagues that McBride’s habeas 
petition must be denied.  I, however, would not reach the 
troubling question of whether a counsel who appeared 
unaware that he could make a successful constitutional 
objection at trial made a reasonable strategic choice.  See 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (“[T]here 
is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance 
claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to 
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant 
makes an insufficient showing on one.”)  Rather, I think that 
McBride failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced under 
Strickland since he cannot demonstrate that there is a 
“substantial” likelihood the jury would have returned a 
verdict of not guilty.  See Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. ---, 
131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011).  The Pennsylvania Superior Court 
relied on an inaccurate description of the facts in determining 
that there was no prejudice.  While we owe those factual 
determinations no deference, we still owe the court’s holding 
deference if it applied Strickland reasonably.  Id. at 785.  
Despite the state court’s errors, it reasonably held that 
McBride was not sufficiently prejudiced by the introduction 
of testimony that referenced his silence during interrogation.  
 
 These references would have been seen by the jury as 
an implicit admission of guilt, Virgin Islands v. Martinez, 620 
F.3d 321, 335 (3d Cir. 2010), but there was ample other 
evidence of his guilt.  Three other witnesses testified that 
McBride admitted to killing Kelly, and there was 
circumstantial physical evidence that linked McBride to the 
crime.  Thus, it is difficult to conclude that there is a 
“substantial” likelihood that the jury would have found 
2 
 
differently if his confession-by-silence was excluded.  See 
Delgadillo v. Wodford, 527 F.3d 919, 930 n.4 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(holding that petitioner was not prejudiced when “largely 
cumulative” improper testimony was admitted).  For this 
reason, I would hold that McBride was not prejudiced and 
that thus his ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails.  
Therefore, I respectfully concur.  
